Институт политических исследований при Фонде Т. Усубалиева

Esen Usubaliev

Taking into account the recent trends in Central Asia to reconsider and even reassess the role of the Russian language, the Cyrillic alphabet and the role of Soviet Russia in the formation and development of Central Asian states, the study of nationalism in the region may be highly relevant. Especially given that Kazakhstan is the only country in the region that directly borders Russia and has a significant Russian and Russian-speaking population living in areas bordering Russia. 

Naturally, such a position of Kazakhstan predetermines its strategic importance both in Russia’s policy towards Kazakhstan and in the policies of other states that understand the special significance of Kazakhstan for Russia’s security. At a superficial glance at the importance of Kazakhstan for the security of the Russian Federation, one can find analogies with Ukraine, which is now being used to create direct military threats to Russia, the neutralisation of which is now being carried out within the framework of the Special Military Operation in Ukraine. However, these analogies end after enumerating the known factors such as ethnicity, borders, language. Otherwise, Kazakhstan’s access to the «outside world» is controlled by Russia and China, as far as trade and transport arteries are concerned. 

In this regard, nationalist sentiments in Kazakhstan are particularly interesting, because despite their futility and lack of a clear external reference point, as say «European identity» in Ukraine, they continue to grow and every year this problem is becoming more and more stable and organised with the prospect of having a serious and long-term impact on socio-political processes in the country. 

The growth of nationalism in Kazakhstan has already led to two parallel processes — the state officially condemns any manifestations of nationalism, while it cannot prevent the propaganda of nationalist ideas, including the work of foreign foundations and organisations in this sphere. 

A series of events in early 2022 (in January 2022, there was an attempted coup d’état and Russian military assistance to stabilise the country) predetermined the aggravation of nationalist sentiments in society, which are traditionally associated with the protection of land, language, culture, way of life and the future development of the ethnos — problems that have always been discussed in Kazakh society — discussions about this periodically took sharp forms depending on internal and external political factors. 

The conditions under which Kazakh nationalism was formed, given the scope of this article, should be presented only in theses, as these issues may be of interest in a more comprehensive study.

The formation of modern Kazakh nationalism took place in the context of two important geopolitical factors — Russia and China, which in the perceptions of Kazakh activists currently «pose a threat to the survival (preservation) of Kazakhs as a nation». These factors have internal and external dimensions, which will be discussed later. 

However, it is interesting that the fact of formation of the Kazakh nation (language, culture, oral folk art), as well as its preservation and development due to Soviet Russia and under Soviet rule, is either completely denied by nationalist circles or silenced. The role of Russia in the defence of the Kazakh people against the policy of China in history is also denied. 

In our opinion, the phenomenon of nationalism should be assessed from the point of view of both political ideology and political psychology, in other words, as a phenomenon that is predominantly psychological, while being used for political purposes. Both «dimensions» of nationalism are closely interrelated and we propose to consider nationalism both as a derivative of social identity (the perception of one’s own and other social identities) and as a derivative of general patterns of psychology of an individual acting in society. 

Nationalism as a psychological phenomenon goes back to two basic states (moods) of individual and collective (group) psychology — the feeling of frustration and the feeling of deprivation. Frustration can be defined in the most general way as disappointment arising due to the impossibility to achieve a particular goal; deprivation — as a feeling of deprivation, deprivation of this or that resource. 

Speaking about Kazakhstan, after the collapse of the USSR, the growth of national consciousness was associated with disappointment that «the Soviet authorities suppressed the national development of Kazakhs, tried to destroy the ethnos, dissolving it in Russian culture, education, way of life, in this regard, the Kazakh ethnos did not develop properly, practically forgetting its culture and traditions of ancestors, not to mention religion». In turn, nationalists believed that for this and many other reasons the Kazakh people had been deprived of development prospects, deprived of human and natural resources as a result of the USSR policy. 

Nevertheless, both of these states entail certain actions (conscious and unconscious) on the part of both the individual and the group: they give rise to aggression, lead to sublimation (directing the released negative mental charge in a constructive direction) and — quite often — to redirection, to the search for guilty parties, scapegoats. The most famous theory that we can rely on in such an analysis is the frustration theory of aggression by J. Dollard and N. Miller. 

Aggression can be hostile and constructive: in the first case, it is aimed only at harming the object that caused the frustration; in the second case, it is aimed at achieving a specific goal that is in the way of its object. If we are talking about social collectives, the guilty scapegoats are usually groups or individuals who are external to the group experiencing frustration and deprivation. External or, at least, different, possessing other characteristics, including ethnic ones. Herein lies the basis of nationalism as a psychological phenomenon. 

In this regard, the first serious and mass nationalist demonstrations in Kazakhstan were recorded in 1986, when a representative of Russian nationality, Genady Kolbin, was put in office as head of the republic, which caused mass unrest and riots. By all accounts, those events can be classified as a reaction of aggression towards a representative of the «external environment» (Russian in ethnic terms), but also as a release of long-accumulated discontent in the national environment with regard to state policy in general, but Kolbin, a representative of the centre, was chosen as the object (occasion). 

Subsequently, «Russian influence», «dominance of the Russian language and culture», as well as other markers indicating links with Russia, became the most important component of Kazakh nationalism. Here it is appropriate to draw an analogy with Ukraine, where similar processes took place — the independence of the ethnos was associated with getting rid of everything that could bind it to Russia. In the future, it is appropriate to consider the peculiarities of the development of nationalist processes in Ukraine and Kazakhstan as the purposeful work of Western structures, which began almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR. 

The psychological nature of nationalism is known to be the basis of any nationalist ideology. A.I. Tevdoy-Burmuli believes that nationalism as an ideology is «the active loyalty of an individual to the cultural community with which he is currently bound by the strongest identitarian ties» [Tevdoy-Burmuli A.I. (2018) Ethno-political dynamics of the European Union. Moscow: Aspect Press. 224 c.]. 

However, the question remains how to interpret the nation — in ethnic, civic, cultural, or any other key; therefore, the definition remains understated. In the most general way, nationalism in the ideological field can be interpreted as ideological mobilisation of ethnic identification for political or cultural purposes. 

Within Kazakh society and the academic community itself, the debate is still relevant as to whether the process of formation of Kazakhs as a nation is complete, including in terms of ethnic, civic and cultural aspects. Not to mention territorial issues — the realisation that part of Kazakhstan’s territory was actually «gifted» by Russia during the formation of the USSR creates additional threats from the possible loss of some territories.

In this case, it makes sense to consider nationalism as an ideology «with a thin-centred ideology» [Freeden, M. (2004) «Conclusion: ideology — balances and projections», in Freeden, M. (ed.), Reassessing political ideologies: the durability of dissent, Routledge, New York, NY, pp. 193-208]. In his view, nationalism is unable to encompass all spheres of human social activity, as classical ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism or socialism claim to do. Nationalism is essentially limited to the ideological support of ethnic processes, while being able to become an element of liberal, conservative or socialist discourse; thus, it does not fit unambiguously into a linear political spectrum. 

In this regard, starting from the processes of nation-building with the formation of the USSR in 1922, after the collapse of this state and the period of Kazakhstan’s independence, Kazakh nationalism could not take shape as a separate ideology, but was incorporated into the views and programmes of various political groups, which, given the special regime of power, could not be formed into active political parties capable of influencing the socio-political situation. 

Special conditions for its development as an ideology of various movements are created now, when Kazakhstan, against the background of the consequences of the events of January 2022, is liberalising political life and, in particular, expanding the list of political parties that can take part in political processes, according to recent statements by President K. Tokayev. 

Nevertheless, unlike the various classifications of nationalism accepted in political science, Kazakh nationalism has the character of different types of nationalism, which are still at the stage of formation, having only certain characteristic features. 

First of all, it is «ethnic nationalism», because it is focused purely on ensuring the narrow needs of ethnic processes — revival, preservation and development of the nation. 

At the same time, it has features of «civic nationalism» — an attempt to direct these processes also in the direction of state-building, where the concepts of nation and nation-state begin to take shape. If we understand the nation as a political community of citizens, not tied to ethnic division, and make it an object of utmost loyalty, this becomes civic nationalism. However, in both cases, the formation of the Kazakh ethnos and the Kazakh nation-state (in any of its understandings) is still an unfinished process, as stated earlier. 

In terms of building statehood, despite the reference to the multinational nature of the state, it is the status and real situation of national minorities that most often becomes the object of aggression on the part of the ethnic majority, which speaks of the immaturity of state consciousness (responsibility of the state-forming national majority). As well as still deep feelings of frustration and deprivation towards other nationalities and the status of the ethnic majority in Kazakhstan, which is not defined, first of all for themselves. 

In many respects, these criteria are the basis for the typology of E. Smith, who identified two major types of nationalism: territorial (which in this case can be partly considered synonymous with «civil» as an antithesis to the principle of ethnicity) and «ethnic». Smith divided each type into pre-independence movements (in the case of the territorial concept — anti-colonial, in the case of the ethnic concept — separatist and diasporal) and those created after independence (in the case of application of the territorial principle — integrationist, in the case of application of the ethnic basis — irredentist and pan-nationalisms) [Smith, Anthony D. Ethnic and Territorial Nationalism // Encyclopaedia of Nationalism / Ed. Leoussi, Athena S.. — Transaction Publishers, 2001. — 495 p.].

However, these criteria are not perfect and it is often difficult to draw a line between civic and ethnic nationalism. In this regard, the very classification and typology of Kazakh nationalism is a not yet formed construct, which has features of ethnic, civic nationalism, territorial and civilisational, directed both against the carriers of other ethnicity, and against representatives of other states, and carriers of other cultural and civilisational attitudes. 

It has an internal and external contour — inside against representatives of other ethnicities, outside against Russia and China. But, as noted above, this is not a formalised ideological platform — these are scattered and still formulated principles that change depending on the political conjuncture. 

The deployment of CSTO troops to Kazakhstan in January 2022 to stabilise the situation after the riots, the core of which was the Russian contingent, led to the actualisation of anti-Russian sentiments in society, although earlier in the year there had been «language patrols» demanding that only Kazakh be spoken and periodic activist speeches against China and its ethnic policy in the XUAR of the PRC towards Uighurs, Kazakhs and Muslims in general. 

The Russian army’s special military operation in Ukraine in February 2022 has provoked a new reaction among the Kazakh population and primarily in nationalist groups, which have always viewed Russia’s policy as a threat to the country’s sovereignty and national identity. A number of experts are also beginning to believe that the socio-political processes in Ukraine and Kazakhstan are synchronised — despite the serious differences in the conditions of formation and development of the two states, the artificial (externally supported) growth of nationalist sentiments has many similarities, which should be examined in detail in another study. 

Summarising the above, it should be emphasised that nationalism in Kazakhstan is a so-called «construct», which is at the stage of its ideological formulation and formation in the form of social and political activity — both individual and group. 

It is based on disparate ideas about the growth of national self-consciousness, preservation and development of the nation (language, culture, way of life) as a reaction to the historical development within the framework of Russian dominance in the political, cultural and educational spheres. The formation of a new future, based on the rejection of a common historical past with Russia, and the building of a nation-state. 

Nevertheless, these ideas have not yet been ideologically formalised or presented in the form of a scientific or political work. In this regard, in their majority, these ideas remain in individual and group consciousness on the edge of political ideology and psychology.

Kazakh nationalism has openly aggressive and passive aggressive forms, periodically manifesting itself in the form of aggression against ethnic minorities, or regular campaigns against both other ethnic groups and external irritants — Russia and China. 

In the context of unfinished processes of formation of the Kazakh ethnos, as well as Kazakh statehood, within which Kazakhs have yet to determine their place, nationalist sentiments create additional vulnerability in the current processes of political stability of Kazakhstan after the end of the «Nazarbayev era». The development of instability, which may be based on the problem of nationalism, will have serious internal and external consequences for the country. 

Esen Usubaliev, PhD, director

May 2022